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ABSTRACT 
Natural capital should be preserved because it exhibits features that distinguish it from all other 
kinds of capital. Natural capital provides basic/fundamental life-support functions, is a necessary 
input into production due to the first law of thermodynamics and is often unique in that its 
destruction is irreversible. The notorious prevalence of risk, uncertainty and ignorance makes it 
difficult, however, to state which parts of natural capital should be preserved. Some forms of 
natural capital are more likely to be substitutable than others. A good case can be made for 
preventing large-scale biodiversity loss, protecting the ozone layer, restricting emissions that 
cause global warming, limiting the accumulation of toxic pollutants and for restricting over-
harvesting and soil erosion. 
Another difficult question is how, to what extent and for how large costs certain forms of natural 
capital should be preserved. Both the ‘precautionary principle’ and the concept of ‘safe minimum 
standards’ are rather elusive, especially on the question of costs. Policy measures are discussed 
that allegedly preserve natural capital at low, or even negative, costs: the abolishment of 
environmentally and economically harmful subsidies, the substitution of market-based for 
command-and-control instruments, the substitution of ecotaxes for labor and capital income 
taxes and the so-called ‘Porter’-hypothesis that tighter environmental regulation will increase 
firms’ productivity. It is argued, however, that while there is some scope for policies that are 
good for the environment and for economic development at the same time, the relationship 
between the environment and the economy is likely to remain one of a fundamental trade-off. 
Resolving this trade-off is beyond scientific reach and should be left to democratic decision 
making. What science can do, is to help basing democratic decisions on rational grounds. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
If society is committed to sustainable development, or sustainability for short, should it preserve 
any natural capital? The answer to this apparently ‘heretic’ question is not as easy and intuitive as 
many environmentalists think. Indeed, the now dominant view among neoclassical economists is 
the perfect substitutability paradigm: What matters for future generations is only the aggregate 
total capital they inherit — be it human-made, natural or any other form of capital (Hartwick 
1990, Solow 1993). According to this view which comes under the name of ‘weak 
sustainability’, the depletion of natural capital does not matter for future generations as long as 
enough other forms of capital are built up instead. 
I define sustainability here as economic development that leaves future generations at least as 
well off as the current generation. Obviously such a definition is anthropocentric in that it denies 
any intrinsic relevance of nature for questions of sustainability. Nature has value if and only if 
humans value nature. Note, however, that humans might value nature for whatever reasons and 
not merely because it contributes to the production of consumption goods or directly produces 
utility through environmental amenities. Humans might very well value nature as such in 
attributing ‘intrinsic’ value to nature, but it is still humans who determine the value. 
What is natural capital? Capital is defined here broadly as a stock that provides current and 
future flows of service. Natural capital is then the totality of nature, i.e. resources, plants, species 
and ecosystems, that is capable of providing human beings with material and non-material flows 
of service. 
This paper argues that to contest the perfect substitutability paradigm of weak sustainability 
one first needs to explicate the distinctive features of natural capital. There are three aspects — 
basic life-support function, necessity for production, irreversibility of destruction — that 
distinguish natural from other forms of capital. Also, one must differentiate and move beyond 
this abstract term ‘natural capital’: Some forms of natural capital are more likely to be 
substitutable than others. 
If that was all, however, sustainability would be an easy task, the prescription simply being to 
preserve all those forms of natural capital that exhibit distinct features and are not likely to be 
substitutable by other forms of capital. But the actual world we are living in is one of imperfect 
information where risk, uncertainty and ignorance abound and financial resources are scarce. The 
absence of certainty and perfect information frustrates any attempt to give clear-cut answers on 
which forms of natural capital should be preserved. 
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The following three sections of this paper develop this argument. Section 2 starts out with 
highlighting distinctive features of natural capital. Section 3 discusses the implications of the 
notorious prevalence of risk, ignorance and uncertainty concerning the environment. Section 4 
brings the first two threads together and states which forms of natural capital are most likely and 
which are less likely in need of an explicit preservation policy. 
The next question is how, to what extent and for how large costs should certain forms of 
natural capital be preserved, given that finance is scarce. Section 5 discusses two famous policy 
principles, namely the precautionary principle and the concept of safe minimum standards that 
were developed to deal with situations of uncertainty and ignorance. As it turns out, both 
principles are very elusive on whether and how much preservation should be undertaken if it is 
costly to do so. Section 6 therefore discusses preservation when financial resources are scarce. It 
asks whether preservation of natural capital can be achieved at low, or even negative, economic 
costs. It analyses the abolishment of wasteful subsidies, the substitution of market-based for 
command-and-control instruments, the substitution of ecotaxes for labor and capital income 
taxes and the so-called ‘Porter’-hypothesis that tighter environmental regulation will increase 
firms’ productivity. It argues that although there is some scope for undertaking measures at 
minimal costs, the relationship between the environment and the economy is likely to remain one 
of a fundamental trade-off rather than a ‘free lunch’. A resolution of this trade-off is beyond 
scientific reach, however, and is rightly to remain in the political realm, because science cannot 
tell society how risk-averse it should be as regards the preservation of natural capital. The social 
and natural sciences can help in making the choices transparent and rational — but how much the 
current generation is willing to sacrifice for preserving natural capital is ultimately a matter of 
democratic decision making. Section 7 concludes. 
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2. DISTINCTIVE FEATURES OF NATURAL CAPITAL 
What makes natural capital distinct from other forms of capital? There are three aspects that can 
justify such a distinction: 
 
• Natural capital provides very basic and fundamental life-support functions that no other form 
of capital can provide. It is multifunctional in a way and to an extent that is not shared by 
other forms of capital (Ehrlich and Ehrlich 1992). Natural capital is the basis of all life, human 
and non-human: It is the world ecosystem that contains the economy, not the economy that 
contains the world ecosystem (Daly and Townsend 1993, p. 3). Mankind can exist and indeed 
has to a large extent existed in the past without major human-made or other forms of capital, 
but it cannot live without some minimum level of natural capital. The outstanding value of 
natural capital is not that we can use fossil fuel, e.g., but that nature enables the very existence 
of human life. Nature might cope with piece-meal destruction for a long time, but if a certain 
threshold is exceeded, the whole system could break down. There are ‘limits to meta-resource 
depletion’ (Ehrlich 1989). These life-support ‘resources’ really are non-substitutable and their 
degradation would often lead to irreversible catastrophes. Their ‘basicness’ makes it difficult 
to estimate accurately or even approximately their specific value. In some sense, they are 
simply priceless: their value to humans is infinite. 
Examples that come to one’s mind are the ozone layer and the biogeochemical cycle of the 
atmosphere. The same applies more generally to basic ecosystem functions. Costanza et al. 
(1997) recently have given a conservative estimate of the value of the world’s ecosystems. 
They suggest this value to lie in the range of US$ 16-54 trillion as a minimum estimate. For 
comparison, global gross national product is about US$ 18 trillion per year, so the value of the 
world’s ecosystems is very large indeed. (Note that in Costanza et al.’s (1997) estimates the 
values for specific items whose magnitude is likely to be infinite as for the global climate have 
been deliberately truncated to make them finite and to provide a lower bound estimate of the 
real value.) 
 
• Natural capital is to some extent a necessary input for production. The first law of 
thermodynamics tells us that nothing can be produced without some resource input and that 
nothing can be destroyed. As long as the energy from solar influx is by and large not used, 
energy and material become invariably transformed from low entropy to high entropy. 
Recycling and re-use can delay this entropic transformation, but it can neither stop nor reverse 
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it according to the second law of thermodynamics. There is some minimum level of natural 
capital that we need for resource input and for taking up the unwanted side-products of output 
(pollution and waste). The conjecture that we could live without any natural capital 
contradicts fundamental physical laws. In contrast, it is possible in principle to live without 
any human-made capital such as factories, machineries, roads etc. 
 
• Some forms of natural capital are unique in that they cannot be rebuilt once they have been 
destroyed. That is, destruction of some forms of natural capital is irreversible or quasi-
irreversible. Some environmental assets are fundamentally non-substitutable which is in 
general not the case for other forms of capital. Human-made capital can always be 
reconstructed if it has been destroyed. Reconstruction is costly, of course, and it may take 
some time, but at least it is possible in principle. Admittedly, this is not true for unique 
historical buildings which provide non-material value, but certainly for human-made capital 
used in production. 
An example for irreversible natural capital loss is the destruction of biodiversity: it is 
impossible to bring an extinct species back to life. Examples for quasi-irreversibility are the 
ozone layer destruction and global warming: Both the ozone layer and the climate may 
‘regenerate’ to their former state if allowed to do so, but it takes ‘too much time’ (from a 
human perspective) to wait for the natural regeneration. The consumption of ‘non-renewable’ 
resources is another example of quasi-irreversibility. 
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3. RISK, UNCERTAINTY AND IGNORANCE 
If we are aware of the distinctive features of natural capital, why can’t we simply preserve all 
those forms of natural capital that provide basic life-support functions, are necessary for 
production and irreversibly lost after destruction? If we lived in a world of certainty and limitless 
financial resources, there would not be any problem. But unfortunately we are living in a world 
that is plagued by ubiquitous risk, uncertainty and ignorance. Therefore we do not know for 
certain which forms of natural capital we should preserve. Also, finance is scarce, an issue which 
is discussed in later sections. 
 
Risk 
Risk refers to a situation where the set of all possible states of the world, the probability 
distribution over the set of possible states and the resulting payoffs can be objectively known. 
Buying a lottery ticket is a good example for engaging in a risky action, because the odds of 
winning can be objectively known as can the costs of buying the ticket and the value of potential 
prizes — hence the expected gain or loss can be computed without any remaining doubt. 
In order to cope with risk, economists have included so-called option values into their 
traditional cost-benefit analyses. In the environmental context, option value is the expected value 
of refraining from an action that leads with some given probability to irreversible environmental 
destruction in order to keep the option open of using the environmental resource in the future. 
Option value can thus be interpreted as a kind of risk premium: it lowers the net benefit of the 
considered action, it reflects an additional opportunity cost and the ‘price’ society is ready to pay 
in order to keep the option of future use of the environmental resource open. The more risk-
averse society is, the higher will the option value be. In case of extreme risk aversion, the option 
value can be infinite and the action that could result in environmental destruction should not be 
undertaken whatever its likely other benefits. On the other hand, if society is risk-preferring, it 
will be more inclined to take the action and risk the irreversible environmental destruction. 
Note that we are typically not confronted with a ‘risky’ situation when we are trying to judge 
the validity of running down natural capital because in most cases we do not know either the 
probability distribution of all possible states nor do we know the potential outcomes resulting 
from the different states of the world. What is worse: often we do not even know the complete 




Uncertainty refers to a situation where the probability distribution over a set of possible states of 
the world and the resulting payoffs cannot be known objectively, but agents have subjective 
beliefs about the objective distribution and the payoffs. Those beliefs can be updated (and in 
many cases improved) over time, i.e. they are not static as is the case in the context of risk, but 
dynamic. Agents can learn to improve their beliefs on the basis of Bayesian decision theory rules 
(Faucheux and Froger 1995). 
Option values can be used in a context of uncertainty as well, only that this time it is the 
subjectively expected value that counts. Additionally, economists have included so-called quasi-
option values into their traditional cost-benefit analyses. In the environmental context, quasi-
option value is the value of delaying an irreversible environmental destruction in order to acquire 
improved information and to make a better informed future decision. For quasi-option values to 
make sense, we have to expect that either future information will tend to favor environmental 
preservation for given preferences or that the preference for environmental resources will 
increase over time. Only then is there a positive value, otherwise there would be a cost in keeping 
the environmental option open (Beltratti, Chichilnisky and Heal 1993, Chichilnisky and Heal 
1993). Note that quasi-option value, contrary to option value, does not depend on society being 
risk-averse; even a risk-loving society can exhibit a positive quasi-option value for preserving an 
environmental resource. 
Uncertainty comes rather close to our present state of knowledge about many rather novel and 
complex, but most pressing environmental problems such as global warming. We know 
something about the effects of dumping greenhouse gases in the atmosphere, we know something 
about the climatic consequences, we can imagine different states of the world following and we 
have some idea about the probability distribution over these different states of the world. Our 
knowledge about climate change is still rather poor, however. 
 
Ignorance 
Ignorance refers to a situation where we have no idea whatsoever about the set of possible states 
of the world, about the probability distribution over the set and about the resulting payoffs. A 
weaker definition would allow for subjective beliefs where those beliefs are largely arbitrary, 
however, and lack a sound foundation. 
It seems fair to say that our knowledge about the extent and the likely consequences of large-
scale biodiversity destruction resembles more a situation of ignorance than of uncertainty. 
Estimates from the United Nations’ Environmental Program of the number of existing species 
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vary between seven and twenty million (Schuh 1995) of which about 1.4 million are named by 
biologists (Brown et al. 1994, p. 4). Our knowledge about most of the named species is only 
rudimentary (Norton 1986). Estimates of expected loss of species over the next 25 years vary 
between 2 and 25% (Schuh 1995) and we are arguably miles away from knowing anything about 
the loss in value terms of this destruction of biodiversity. As Norton (1986, p. 203) rightly 
argues, ‘it is an understatement to refer to this level of ignorance as mere ‘uncertainty’’. We are 
— almost necessarily — so much ignorant of the complex interlinkages within ecosystems that 
we cannot know the value of either single species or the whole of biodiversity to any reasonable 
extent of precision. 
Climate change is another example for ignorance. We have introduced it under the heading of 
uncertainty above, but IPCC (1996, p. 161) rightly claims that ‘when dealing with many of the 
effects of climate change, ignorance is perhaps a more appropriate concept than uncertainty’. The 
lesson is that often environmental problems have aspects of both uncertainty and ignorance. 
Also, ignorance has in the past been quite common for environmental problems: DDT and 
CFCs were both thought to be benign for the environment before their detrimental effect was 
discovered. And ignorance is arguably a pretty good description of the quality of our knowledge 
about the consequences of human activity on the state of the environment beyond the very 
immediate future. 
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4. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE IMPORTANCE OF NATURAL CAPITAL 
The combination of risk, uncertainty and ignorance with the distinctive characteristics of natural 
capital (basic life-support functions, necessity for production, irreversibility of destruction) 
frustrates any attempt to draw any general conclusions on which forms of natural capital should 
be preserved. Some forms carry more of the distinctive features than others, some are more prone 
to uncertainty and ignorance than others. It is therefore necessary to go one step beyond this 
abstract notion ‘natural capital’ and to distinguish which forms are more and which forms are 
less in need for explicit preservation. 
 
Biodiversity and global environmental resources 
Take ecosystems and the biodiversity they exhibit first. It is a well established fact in ecology 
that ecosystems are characterized by highly nonlinear, discontinuous and discrete changes in their 
ecological ‘resilience’, that is, in their ability to ‘recover from and thus absorb’ (Barbier, Burgess 
and Folke 1994, p. 17) external and internal shocks. The stability of ecosystems ultimately 
depends on the extent of its resilience and not so much on the stability of individual components. 
The complexity of ecosystems is still poorly understood and not easy to understand anyway. 
‘Ecosystems do not have single equilibria with functions controlled to remain near it. Rather, 
destabilizing forces far from equilibria, multiple equilibria and the absence of equilibria define 
functionally different states’ (Holling 1995, p. 49). Due to this fact, an ecosystem might be able 
to cope with piecemeal destruction for quite a long time, but it can break down unexpectedly fast 
after some (often unknown) threshold has been transgressed (Perrings and Pearce 1994). In some 
sense, every small-scale destruction of an ecosystem increases the likelihood of unraveling the 
whole ecosystem (Randall 1991, p. 65). While not undisputed (see Perrings, Folke and Mäler 
1992), there is a large body of evidence from ecological studies suggesting that ‘resilience 
increases with system complexity, and complexity can be measured by biological diversity. In 
that way, the more diversity there is, the more resilience there is and hence the more sustainable 
the system is.’ (Pearce 1994, p. 148). Ceteris paribus, the more biodiversity there is, the bigger is 
the opportunity set open for future generations (Perrings 1994). Hence, there is a good case for 
preventing biodiversity loss. 
There is also, more generally, a good case for protecting the ‘global environmental system’ 
(Clark 1995, p. 146) such as the global climate and the ozone layer. Both are fundamental life-
support resources whose destruction would endanger the welfare if not the existence of coming 
generations. While a certain rise in atmospheric concentration of carbon dioxide seems 
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inevitable, precautionary action should be undertaken to prevent large and unpredictable changes 
in the global climate. Since we do not know exactly beyond which concentration these 
catastrophic changes will occur we must make sure that our emissions stay well below the limit 
that best available science suggests to be the critical level. 
 
Accumulating toxic pollutants 
A good case can also be made for not letting emissions, especially highly toxic and health-
damaging emissions, accumulate in the environment. The aim should be to not letting emissions 
exceed ‘critical loads’ after which the capacity of the receiving media to dissipate and diffuse 
emissions would be damaged. This prescription would rule out the use of highly toxic chemicals 
if they cannot be prevented from entering the environment. It would also rule out the use of 
nuclear power with its highly damaging by-products on all stages of the nuclear circle and its 
accumulating highly toxic nuclear waste radiating for tens of thousands of years. 
 
Natural resources 
One might wonder why so little has been said about the necessity of resources for production. 
The reason is that in a context of risk, uncertainty and ignorance it seems likely that the 
distinctive features of natural capital are especially relevant when it comes to the global 
environmental system and accumulating toxic pollutants as opposed to the global resource 
system. Property rights over resources are often much better defined and the global 
environmental system, unlike the global resource system, lacks an ‘automatic self-correcting 
feedback loop’ (Clark 1995, p. 146) and especially lacks a functioning price system. There are 
good reasons to presume that the global resource system will be much better taken care of in 
some way or other than the global environmental system. It is the waste absorbing function of the 
environment that is most under threat and least protected. That is not to say, that resource 
availability might never pose a problem, but the frequent falsification of alarms about immediate 
resource exhaustion presents a case in point (e.g. Meadows et al. 1972). The world economy has 
so far exhibited a most remarkable capability to overcome resource constraints via substitution 
and technical improvements. 
 
Food resources 
What about food resources? To feed more people there are two basic strategies. One is 
extensification: It is estimated that the amount of land usable for growing crops is three times 
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larger than current usage (Preston 1996, p. 96). Alternatively, land could be used more 
intensively. In Europe, for example, usage of cropland fell by one quarter and the total forested 
area grew by 30 percent in spite of increased food production (Preston 1996, p. 99). Table 1 
shows the trend in per capita world food production alongside production in Africa and Asia. 
 
 
The figures reveal that while food production has caught up with growing world population 
and has even increased in per capita terms in Asia and the world as a whole over the last thirty 
years or so, it has dramatically declined in Africa. What this suggests is that the availability of 
food is more a problem of intra-generational distribution than of inter-generational sustainability 
as such. However, where there are clear signs of over-harvesting, soil erosion and land 
degradation a good case can be made to enforce ‘sustainable’ harvesting, that is harvesting within 
the limits of natural regeneration, and to maintain soil fertility. The availability of food is most 
basic to ensure non-decreasing future welfare and where there are clear signs that danger to food 
security is imminent, conservatory steps should be undertaken. 
Nature as such does not seem to impose limits on increasing food production enough to feed 
many more people. Waggoner (1994, p. 1) in a Task Force Report for the American Council for 
Agricultural Science and Technology comes to the conclusion that ‘the global totals of sun on 
land, CO2 in the air, fertilizer, and even water could produce far more food than ten billion 
[people] need’ . For other cautiously optimistic views on the availability of food for a human 
population rising up to ten or twelve billion people see Ruttan (1991) and Bongaarts (1994). 
 
In summary, a good case can be made 
• for conserving ‘rather more than less’ natural capital in the form of biodiversity, 
• for protecting the ozone layer and restricting emissions that cause global warming, 
• for limiting the accumulation of toxic pollutants and  
Table 1. Index of per capita food production (1979-81 = 100). 
 
1964-66 1979-81 1982-84 1984-86 1992-94 
WORLD 95 100 102 104 104 
AFRICA 109 100 94 95 94 
ASIA 92 100 108 113 127 
Source: WRI (1988-89, p. 272f.; 1996-97, p. 238f.) 
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• for restricting over-harvesting and soil erosion. 
The case is strengthened by the fact that examples abound where there are negative 
interlinkages between environmental problems: Deforestation often worsens loss of topsoil and 
land degradation and contributes to global warming. Acid rain not only kills forests but also 
contaminates freshwater sources. Ozone depletion contributes to global warming and some of the 
substitutes for CFCs have high global warming potentials. 
But how to put these prescriptions into practical policy-making? Even if we knew exactly 
which forms of natural capital we should preserve, the question is still how much preservation 
should there be and how much cost should be incurred for preservation? There exist two famous 
policy principles, namely the precautionary principle and the concept of safe minimum standards. 
Do they give clear answers to what extent and at what costs the critical forms of natural capital 
should be preserved? Note that the following arguments cannot, for reasons of space, discuss all 
critical forms of natural capital. Discussion is limited to biodiversity protection and, albeit less 
so, to global warming. 
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5. POLICY PRINCIPLES TO COPE WITH RISK, UNCERTAINTY AND IGNORANCE 
5.1 THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE 
The most basic principle is the so-called ‘precautionary principle’. It has two important elements: 
First, preventive measures for environmental conservation should be undertaken before there are 
definite scientific results ‘proving’ that protection of the environment is necessary. The 
motivation is to avoid regretting environmental inaction after unacceptable irreversible 
environmental destruction has already taken place. One good example is global warming. As 
environmentalists emphasize: It is better to be vaguely right in time than precisely right too late. 
Second and related to the first point, the burden of proof should shift to those who believe that an 
action has only negligible detrimental consequences on the environment. That is, the new default 
position should favor environmental preservation, whereas current practice still favors economic 
activity over environmental preservation. The precautionary principle can thus be interpreted as 
an insurance scheme against uncertain future environmental catastrophes. 
The precautionary principle was first integrated into official policy statements in the 1970s in 
former Western Germany in the form of the so-called Vorsorgeprinzip (Boehmer-Christiansen 
1994). It soon found its way in virtually every official document on the environment and in 
countless international environmental treaties (Cameron and Wade-Grey 1995). It should come 
as no great surprise that this seeming ‘success’ of the precautionary principle was largely due to 
the fact that it does not provide any clear operationable guidelines or a rigorous analytical 
scheme. As Bodansky (1991) observes, the precautionary principle is not able to give a clear 
answer on when it should be applied, that is, what are acceptable and unacceptable 
environmental dangers, at what costs it should be applied and what types of precautionary actions 
should be undertaken. 
 
5.2 SAFE MINIMUM STANDARDS (SMS) 
Another principle that seemingly takes better account of the question of preservation costs is the 
Safe Minimum Standard (SMS). Propositions to introduce SMS date back to Ciriacy-Wantrup 
(1952) and were originally reserved for issues of species preservation and biodiversity protection. 
Recently, however, the notion of SMS has been increasingly used for other environmental topics 
as well. IPCC (1996, p. 159), e.g., speaks of an ‘affordable safe minimum standard’ for reduction 
of greenhouse gases. 
SMS in the context of species preservation calls for granting a species some minimally viable 
standard, as long as the economic costs of doing so are not ‘unacceptably high’. The reason for 
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adopting SMS is that because of risk, uncertainty and ignorance the exact value of biodiversity 
cannot be measured. Hence, to avoid potentially high future costs, biodiversity should be 
conserved — to repeat: as long as the costs of doing so are not ‘unacceptably high’. 
The concept of SMS has been officially embraced by UNEP’s Global Biodiversity Program 
(Crowards 1996, p.16). The Endangered Species Act in the U.S. has many characteristics of a 
SMS (Castle and Berrens 1993, p. 122). The U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service has considerable 
leeway to intrude into property rights and impose conservation of endangered species on private 
agents. Economic actions that threaten the existence of endangered species are only allowed if 
‘the benefits of such action clearly outweigh the benefits of alternative courses of action 
consistent with conserving the species on its critical habitat’ (Endangered Species Act 
Amendments of 1978, public law 95-632). 
One of the most fundamental problems of SMS is that it cannot define what ‘unacceptable 
costs’ are. The reason why many people would support SMS is presumably that everyone can 
have his or her own idea of what unacceptable costs are. Another major problem is that the SMS 
gives no guidance to which species or habitats scarce financial resources should be allocated and 
there can be no doubt that the available resources are limited. Stevens et al. (1991, p. 399) claim 
that since we do not know which particular species are worth while protecting, applying the SMS 
with its focus on the costs of preventing species extinction is superior to cost-benefit analysis 
since it can do without making estimates of the potential benefits of protecting a specific species. 
But Stevens et al.’s (1991) claim is not true: the awkward and often badly informed choices are 
simply transferred to another level of decision-making. While it seems likely that more species 
will be protected under a SMS regime, selections still have to be made where financial resources 
are scarce. 
Note that the protection costs are likely to be high even in terms of direct management costs 
due to the complexity of safeguarding the resilience of an ecosystem. The main costs arise in 
terms of opportunity costs, however, due to blocking economic development in a large part of a 
nation’s area. There are definite, present, real costs for uncertain, future and perhaps intangible 
benefits in applying SMS. Also, the actual protector will not be able to reap all of the potential 
future benefits because some of the benefits are positive externalities to other people in other 
countries, i.e. the protection of biodiversity has to some extent the characteristics of a global 
public good. Consequently, there are powerful incentives to free ride on others’ effort for 
biodiversity protection. Since every potential protector has the incentive to free ride, none of 
them might have sufficient impetus to protect biodiversity. 
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The financial constraints are exacerbated by the fact that the vast majority of the world’s 
biological diversity exists in only a few nation-states that belong to the poorest of the world, with 
the notable exception of Australia (Swanson 1994, p. 806). There will be no way to protect 
biodiversity without considerable financial transfers from rich to poor countries, as confirmed by 
initial, albeit small, transfers under the Global Environmental Facility (GEF) fund and UNEP’s 
Biodiversity program where the rich countries pay poor countries for biodiversity protection. 
Time and again, we have reached the point where preserving some critical components of 
natural capital — while desirable for good reasons — appears to be a costly endeavor to 
undertake. It is therefore unavoidable to discuss the preservation of natural capital in a world of 
scarce financial resources now. 
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6. PRESERVING NATURAL CAPITAL WHEN FINANCE IS SCARCE 
To get a taste of the problems policy-makers wanting to preserve critical components of natural 
capital are faced with, it is worth while further discussing biodiversity protection. As long as 
there are no sufficient international financial transfers from rich donor countries (as seems likely 
to be the case), giving priority to biodiversity protection and other environmental problems can 
lead to awkward choices whose consequences we might not be very comfortable with. It is worth 
quoting Beckerman (1994, p. 194f.) at some length here: 
 
Given the acute poverty and environmental degradation in which a large part of the world’s 
population live, one could not justify using up vast resources in an attempt to preserve from 
extinction, say, every one of the several million species of beetles that exist. For the cost of such a 
task would be partly, if not wholly, resources that could otherwise have been devoted to more urgent 
environmental concerns, such as increasing access to clean drinking water or sanitation in the Third 
World. 
 
Jacobs (1995, p. 63) claims that in practice we are not faced with many choices of the ‘preserve 
some obscure species’ versus ‘improve basic health care’ type, but at least they cannot be ruled 
out in principle. While we might not want to preserve every beetle as such, we might well want 
to preserve the totality of remaining tropical rainforests where the vast majority of beetles 
resides. Hence there will remain cases where fundamental ethical conflicts arise and the 
sustainability criterion in itself is not well equipped to deal with those problems. 
This fact is neglected by Costanza (1994, p. 394) who believes that uncertainty and ignorance 
are reasons enough for preserving the complete stock of natural capital: 
 
While a lower stock of natural capital may be sustainable, given our uncertainty and the dire 
consequences of guessing wrong, it is best to at least provisionally assume that we are at or below the 
range of sustainable stock levels and allow no further decline in natural capital. This ‘constancy of 
total natural capital’ rule can thus be seen as a prudent minimum condition for assuring sustainability, 
to be abandoned only when solid evidence to the contrary can be offered. 
 
Costanza’s reasoning completely ignores the fact that there is rarely a ‘free lunch’, that there 
is almost always a price you have to pay, here the (opportunity) costs of preserving the whole 
stock — so the benefits and the costs of preservation still have to be balanced in some way. 
Unfortunately, there is no easy answer to how this trade-off should take place. If the benefits of 
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conserving natural capital are largely uncertain and speculative, economic theory cannot tell us 
how much conservation should be undertaken because it cannot tell society how risk averse it 
should be. It has to leave answering this question to democratic decision-making. What it can do, 
however, is to help finding out measures which lead to a desired environmental objective at least 
cost. Therefore we are turning our attention to ways to protect the environment at minimal 
economic cost now. 
 
Abolishing environmentally and economically harmful subsidies 
What can be said rather unambiguously is that actions that both protect the environment and 
improve economic efficiency should be undertaken. In many instances governments have 
introduced subsidies, fail to establish and protect property rights, invite rent-seeking behavior etc. 
that lead to both environmental destruction and to growth-retarding distortions in the economy. 
Abandoning these practices, so the argument, would be good for the environment in dramatically 
easing the pressure on the remaining ecosystems and good for economic growth at the same time. 
These are the World Bank’s (1992) famous ‘win-win-situations’. They indeed open the way for a 
‘free lunch’: Society can have both a better environment and higher economic growth at no or 
even negative net cost. 
The prospect for these situations is, at least in principle and theory, higher than one might 
expect. Roodman (1996, p. 6) estimates environmentally damaging and economically distorting 
subsidies for water use, energy use, agriculture etc. to be at least 500 bn US$. Pearce (1996, p. 8) 
states an upper estimation bound of 1,000 bn US$. The latter figure comes close to 5% of world 
GNP! 
Note, however, that often behind these subsidies stand vested political interests, as for 
example with the European Union’s Common Agricultural Policy, which means that they are 
difficult to abolish (see Roodman 1996, pp. 52-56, for more detail). The abolition of these 
subsidies would come at negative economic costs, but at high political costs and would create 
immense distributional conflicts. Sometimes there are also good reasons for the subsidies and in 
some cases, as in agricultural subsidies in Northern countries, the environmental impacts of 
abolishing the subsidies and liberating agricultural trade are ambiguous (Lutz 1992). 
Nevertheless, the reported figures give a rough idea of what could be done to make some 
progress towards sustainability. 
In many countries there are also likely to be many cases where environmental pollution 
directly harms economic productivity, either via damaging production inputs or via undermining 
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the health of the labor force. Systematic evidence on this question is scarce, but many case 
studies have shown that often some level of environmental production is self-financing because it 
leads to higher economic productivity (see World Bank 1992, ch. 2, pp. 44-63). Of course, policy 
makers have to intervene in order to get something done since the environmental pollution is 
most often the consequence of some economic agent externalizing environmental costs on 
someone else and he or she is therefore not likely to abate emissions on his or her own just 
because this would be in the social interest. 
 
Substituting market-based for command-and-control instruments 
Another possibility to enhance sustainability while at the same time limiting the negative 
consequences on economic growth is using market-based instruments like emission taxes and 
tradable permits for environmental protection instead of the still much more widely used 
command-and-control instruments. Unfortunately, economists in the past have been over-
optimistic as concerns the advantages of market-based instruments and have often overlooked 
administrative and political economy problems with applying taxes and permits (see Hanley, 
Hallett and Moffatt 1990, Hahn 1990, Hahn and Axtell 1995, Stavins 1995). Indeed, the static 
efficiency advantages have often been exaggerated by comparing a theoretical ideal of market-
based instruments with real world examples of command-and-control and by ignoring the 
preponderance of uncertainty about the costs and benefits of environmental protection measures 
(Stavins 1996). 
However, the static advantages are of minor interest in a sustainability context. What is more 
relevant here is the dynamic advantage of market-based instruments. Both taxes and tradable 
permits are dynamically efficient in that they induce firms not only to reduce resource 
consumption or pollution emission to the desired level but to explore and develop new and even 
less pollution- or resource-intensive technologies in order to pay less taxes or earn additional 
revenues via selling permits. Command-and-control instruments, whether demanding a specific 
environmental performance or prescribing a certain technical standard, are dynamically 
inefficient because over-compliance would not save money to the firm and developing new 
technologies risks inducing the environmental authority to tighten the standard without the firm 
being able to reap the benefits of its improvement. 
Technical progress plays an important, if not the most important, role in overcoming resource 
constraints and in mitigating the pollution side-effects of economic activity — so market-based 
instruments with their built-in dynamic efficiency have clear advantages over command-and-
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control instruments. There has been some increase in the use of market-based instruments in 
OECD-countries over the last decade or so, but their extent remains modest and they have rather 
supplemented than replaced command-and-control instruments (Pearson 1995, p. 357). More 
research should go into the question of what the political economy problems in applying market-
based instruments are and how they could be overcome. This recommendation gains additional 
justification when, as is not duly recognized yet, the positive effects on sustainability of replacing 
existing command-and-control instruments with taxes or permits are also taken into account. 
 
Changing the tax-base of the economy? 
Taxes and permits, if initially sold to firms and not ‘grandfathered’, also raise revenues for the 
public authority. No wonder then that economists have come up with the idea of using market-
based instruments also to raise public revenues in order to reduce other distortive taxes — going 
as far as proposing a grand-design change in the base of the tax system of a country away from 
taxing labor or capital income towards taxing resource and energy input and pollution emission 
(e.g. Daly and Costanza 1992, p. 45). 
There would be ample space for such large-scale changes since it is estimated that roughly 
fifty per cent of all state revenue in EU-countries comes from taxes that are directly or indirectly 
levied on labor whereas less than ten per cent comes from taxes on natural resource use and 
pollution taxes (Tindale and Holtham 1996, p. 64). Figures for other OECD-countries are similar 
(McCoy 1996, p. 211). So far, only Norway and Sweden and, to a lesser extent, Denmark, 
Finland and the Netherlands have undertaken some preliminary steps in the direction of deriving 
state revenue from ‘ecotaxes’ rather than other taxes — for an overview over environmental 
taxation in OECD-countries see Barde (1996). 
Changing the tax-base of the economy towards replacing ecotaxes for taxes on labor has also 
gained some wider support among economists in recent years as a ‘no regret’-policy to combat 
global warming, because it is believed that raising taxes on carbon emissions and compensating 
fully with reductions in other distortive taxes will be good for both the climate and the economy, 
especially for fostering employment (Pearce 1991, Jaeger 1995). This is the so-called ‘double 
dividend hypothesis’. 
If the hypothesis was true, this would be excellent from an environmental point of view. The 
reason is that the benefits from environmental protection are often uncertain, as argued in former 
sections of this paper, in contrast to the direct costs of doing so. The optimal internalization of 
environmental externalities via Pigouvian taxes as presented in the neat little diagrams of 
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environmental economics textbooks is very often virtually impossible in reality. If the double 
dividend hypothesis was true, many more measures to protect the environment could be justified 
since it would not be necessary anymore to know the exact magnitude of the environmental 
benefits. It would be enough to know that the environmental benefits are positive, however big, 
since due to the double dividend environmental protection will come at no or even negative net 
economic costs. 
Also, many environmentally harmful emissions cannot be measured because of the sheer 
number of emission sources or because measurement is prohibitively expensive. It would then be 
sufficient to tax inputs such as energy and resources which are much more easy to monitor than 
pollution emissions. Doing so makes sense as long as the link between energy or resource input 
and pollution is sufficiently strong. Referring back to carbon emissions, it would be sufficient to 
tax different energy inputs approximately according to their carbon content rather than trying to 
measure carbon emissions exactly at the ‘end of the pipe’. In short, the double dividend 
hypothesis seems to open the way for a much bigger ‘free lunch’ than the abolition of 
environmentally and economically harmful subsidies. But does it really hold? 
Prima facie the hypothesis appears to be convincing: Substituting the taxation of ‘bads’ such 
as pollution for the taxation of ‘goods’ such as labor and capital while keeping the overall tax 
burden of an economy the same should enhance economic activity rather than reduce it. On 
closer inspection, however, economists using highly complex general equilibrium models have 
contested this view. The point is that a tax on, e.g., energy input works its way through other 
markets and in the end amounts to an implicit tax on labor (tax interaction effect). This implicit 
tax has to be set higher than the direct tax on labor, however, because a successful environmental 
tax erodes its own base if the addressed firms partially reduce energy input or use less polluting 
inputs (erosion effect). Thus, substituting ecotaxes for labor taxes cannot but exacerbate existing 
distortions in the economy (Bovenberg and Mooij 1995, Bovenberg and Goulder 1995). The 
effects on employment depend largely on whether the implicit fall in relative labor costs due to 
decreasing the taxes on labor income will be fully compensated by higher real wages or not. If 
they are, then no beneficial effects on employment are to be expected (Carraro, Galeotti and 
Gallo 1996). Results are less clear-cut if the revenues from environmental taxation are used to 
reduce capital taxes which are generally presumed to be highly distortive. Under certain, fairly 
restrictive conditions a double dividend is possible (Goulder 1994, pp. 12ff.). 
Other economists have insisted that a double dividend is much more likely to hold. They have 
based their arguments more on logical reasoning than theoretical modeling, however, which 
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weakens their case since the effects of taxation are usually so difficult to assess that they can only 
be captured in complex models. Jaeger (1995, p. 56), e.g., argues that taxing pollution should be 
regarded as broadening the tax base of the economy via taxing a hitherto untaxed ‘commodity’. 
Since it is a standard result in public finance economics that second-best taxation is the less 
distortive the wider is the tax base one should expect the overall welfare burden due to taxation 
to decline and thus the double dividend hypothesis to hold. Similarly, Ekins (1996, p. 158) 
argues that the environmental externality should be considered as distorting other markets as well 
through market-interaction effects. Internalizing this externality via a pollution tax should make 
other markets less distorted rather than exacerbating existing distortions since the distortion due 
to the environmental externality is abolished. 
The debate on the double divided is unlikely to be resolved over the next decade or so. It 
might actually never be resolved since the conclusions are highly dependent on the modeling 
approach and every model can be contested for not including important aspects whose inclusion 
would alter the model results. It seems fair to say, however, that the double dividend hypothesis 
has not been really proven so far and that the relationship between the environment and the 
economy is more likely to remain one of a fundamental trade-off rather than a free lunch where 
both environmental protection and economic growth can be achieved at the same time at zero or 
even negative net cost. That does not mean that environmental protection should not be 
undertaken, but rather that it has to be justified more for its environmental benefits alone rather 
than for its alleged additional beneficial effect on the general economy. 
Totally uncontroversial, however, is the fact that the economic costs of environmental 
protection will be lower (but still positive) if the revenue is used to reduce other distortive taxes 
rather than increasing the overall tax burden of the economy or returning the taxes to consumers 
via lump-sum transfers. Creating revenues that can be used to reduce other distortive taxes also 
represents an advantage of market-based instruments over command-and-control instruments in 
addition to the advantages already presented in the last sub-section. 
 
Regulating tighter for increasing productivity? 
Equally contested as the call for a large-scale change in the tax base of an economy is the 
proposition put forward by Porter and van der Linde (1995) (the so-called ‘Porter’-hypothesis) 
that there are many cases in which tightening environmental regulations would at the same time 
increase firms’ economic profitability, i.e. cases in which tighter environmental standards come 
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at no economic costs or even at economic benefits. The idea is that tighter regulation, if properly 
designed, would trigger firms to innovate and thus to become more productive. 
Economists have not found this argument very convincing (see Oates, Palmer and Portney 
1993; Palmer, Oates and Portney 1995), for mainly two reasons: First, the ‘Porter’-hypothesis 
assumes that firms are foregoing opportunities to increase their profitability, i.e. they are working 
inefficiently. They need a government to tell them how to improve their productivity, so to speak. 
In a competitive context firms working inefficiently will be outcompeted by their more efficient 
rivals, however, which implies that the foregoing of profitable opportunities can at most be a 
transitory and marginal phenomenon. Second, even if those opportunities existed and were not 
seized by private firms it is still doubtful whether the government can know any better and is able 
to design environmental regulation such that firms’ profits increase. If the ‘Porter’-hypothesis 
was true, then why do we see firms lobbying against environmental protection programs instead 
of lobbying for tighter environmental regulation? Porter and van der Linde (1995) cite dozens of 
examples which allegedly buttress their case. But ‘examplerism’ is no substitute for systematic 
empirical evidence and Jaffe, Peterson and Stavins (1995) in a survey of the existing evidence 
did not find any systematic support for the ‘Porter’-hypothesis. 
That is not to say that firms, and even less so consumers who are not faced with constant 
competitive pressure, are always operating efficiently. If that was the case, how could we explain 
the existence of business consulting? One area where it has been shown that opportunities for 
environmental protection exist that are not widely exploited and could save money at the same 
time is energy conservation — both within firms and private households (Jochem and Gruber 
1990, Jaffe and Stavins 1994, Jackson 1995). The reasons for this failure are presumably a 
mixture of lack of information and awareness, lack of technical expertise and lack of strong 
incentives because of the low share of energy costs among total expenditure. Here, policy-makers 
could help to overcome these obstacles via providing information and expertise and via inducing 
electric utilities to ‘sell’ energy efficiency improvements. Thus some cheap if not costless steps 
towards environmental protection could be made. 
One must beware not overestimating the prospects for these costless opportunities, however. 
The claim that 20% and more of carbon emissions in industrialized countries can be cut at no 
economic costs due to energy conservation measures — a claim which is often found in so-called 
bottom-up engineering studies of the costs of carbon emission abatement (IPCC 1996, pp. 303-
343) — is rather dubious because it neglects the many informal transaction costs that prevent 
firms and consumers alike to seize these self-paying opportunities. That something is costless in 
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theoretical Nirvana does not mean that it will be costless in the actual world we are living in. It 
seems fair to say, therefore, that while there are some unexploited options and informed policy-
makers can help to realize these options, it is nevertheless true that substantial environmental 
protection will have its economic price. 
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7. CONCLUSION 
In this paper I have made explicit why natural capital is different from other forms of capital and 
is not likely to be perfectly substitutable as the concept of ‘weak sustainability’ holds. On the 
other hand, due to risk, uncertainty and ignorance it is no easy task to name those forms of capital 
which are indispensable for the welfare of future generations. I have argued that a good case can 
be made for preserving ‘rather more than less’ natural capital, especially in the form of protecting 
biodiversity and global environmental life-support ‘resources’ such as the ozone layer and the 
global climate, in the form of limiting the accumulation of toxic pollutants and in the form of 
preventing unsustainable harvesting and soil erosion. However, I was not able to give exact 
boundaries. 
The analysis of policy principles such as the precautionary principle and the concept of SMS 
has failed to provide clear-cut policy recommendations for cases where environmental protection 
can only be achieved via incurring real economic costs. Both principles are unable to provide 
guidelines on what should be regarded as ‘excessive costs’ of preserving natural capital. I have 
therefore highlighted some measures that could be undertaken without major, if any, real 
economic costs. Realizing these measures would mean to establish and protect property rights, to 
abolish environmentally and economically harmful subsidies, to substitute market-based for 
command-and-control instruments, to use the revenues from environmental taxation such that 
their economic costs are minimized and to help overcome obstacles for realizing self-paying 
efficiency improvements. Putting these measures into practice would also mean to substantially 
roll back the current destruction of all kinds of natural capital. If it turned out afterwards, that the 
world would still be unsustainable, additional measures for the preservation of certain forms of 
natural capital can be undertaken even if this is costly to do. 
It has to be admitted that the analysis of this paper was not able to give clear-cut answers on 
how much and which forms of natural capital at what costs to preserve in order to insure against 
the non-achievement of sustainability and to prevent ex post surprise. There is always the 
possibility that we run down too much natural capital in spite of our ex ante expectation that this 
depletion of natural capital would not endanger sustainability. Overall then, ensuring 
sustainability in a world of uncertainty and scarce financial resources is no easy task. On the 
other hand, there is also the clear danger to either spent too many scarce financial resources on 
the preservation of natural capital and thereby to significantly reduce the consumption 
possibilities of the current and future generations or to channel the resources available for 
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preserving natural capital into the wrong channels and thereby ‘preserve’ forms of natural capital 
that are not really threatened. 
How risk-averse society should be in making decisions on preserving natural capital and how 
much economic costs it would be willing to incur for doing so is not a question economic (or any 
other) theory can tell us. It is a question that has to be decided in the political arena. What science 
can do is to highlight the prevalent issues and to provide some rough estimates of benefits and 
costs of some action as well as looking for least-cost measures to reach a certain environmental 
objective. But the setting of the objective itself is outside the scientific realm. There are limits to 
what science can and should do. 
27 
Acknowledgement 
I thank James Putzel, Mathias Hafner and Michael Jacobs for helpful comments. All errors are 
mine. Financial assistance from the German National Scholarship Foundation and from the 
European Commission is gratefully acknowledged. 
28 
REFERENCES 
Barbier, Edward B., Joanne C. Burgess, and Carl Folke (1994). Paradise Lost? — The Ecological 
Economics of Biodiversity. (London: Earthscan) 
Barde, Jean-Philippe. (1996). Environmental Taxation: Experience in OECD Countries. In 
Timothy O’Riordan (ed.) Ecotaxation, pp 223-245. (London: Earthscan) 
Beckerman, Wilfred. (1994). ‘Sustainable Development’: Is it a Useful Concept?. Environmental 
Values 3, pp. 191-209 
Beltratti, Andrea, Graciela Chichilnisky and Geoffrey Heal. (1993). Preservation, Uncertain 
Future Preferences and Irreversibility. Working Paper 59-93 (Milano: Fondazione ENI 
Enrico Mattei) 
Bodansky, Daniel (1991). Scientific Uncertainty and the Precautionary Principle. Environment 
33, pp. 4-5 and 43-44 
Boehmer-Christiansen, Sonja (1994). The Precautionary Principle in Germany — Enabling 
Government. In Timothy O’Riordan and James Cameron (eds.) Interpreting the 
Precautionary Principle, pp. 31-60. (London: Earthscan) 
Bongaarts, John (1994). Can the Growing Human Population Feed Itself? — As Human 
Numbers Surge Toward 10 billion, some Experts are Alarmed, others Optimistic. Who is 
Right?. Scientific American March, pp. 18-24 
Bovenberg, A. Lans and Lawrence H. Goulder (1995). Costs of Environmentally Motivated 
Taxes in the Presence of Other Taxes: General Equilibrium Analyses, Working Paper No. 
5117 (Cambridge (Mass.): National Bureau of Economic Research) 
Bovenberg, A. Lans and Ruud A. de Mooij (1995). Do Environmental Taxes Yield a Double 
Dividend?. In Gianna Boera and Aubrey Silberston (eds.) Environmental Economics: 
Proceedings of a Conference held by the Confederation of European Economics 
Association at Oxford, pp. 52-69. (London: Macmillan) 
Brown, Katrina, David W. Pearce, Charles Perrings and Timothy Swanson (1994). Economics 
and the Conservation of Global Biological Diversity, Working Paper No. 2 (Washington 
D.C.: Global Enironment Facility) 
29 
Cameron, James and Will Wade-Gery (1995). Addressing Uncertainty: Law, Policy and the 
Development of the Precautionary Principle. In Bruno Dente (ed.) Environmental Policy in 
Search of New Instruments, pp. 95-142. (Dordrecht: Kluwer) 
Carraro, Carlo, Marzio Galeotti and Massimo Gallo (1996). Environmental Taxation and 
Unemployment: Some Evidence on the ‘Double Dividend Hypothesis’ in Europe. Journal 
of Public Economics 62, pp. 141-181 
Castle, Emery N. and Robert P. Berrens (1993). Endangered Species, Economic Analysis, and 
the Safe Minimum Standard. Northwest Environmental Journal 9, pp. 108-130 
Chichilnisky, Graciela and Geoffrey Heal (1993). Global Environmental Risks. Journal of 
Economic Perspectives 7, pp. 65-86 
Ciriacy-Wantrup, S.V. (1952). Resource Conservation: Economics and Policies (Berkeley: 
University of California Press) 
Clark, Colin W. (1995). Scale and the Feedback Mechanism in Market Economics. In Timothy 
Swanson (ed.) The Economics and Ecology of Biodiversity Decline — The Forces driving 
Global Change, pp. 143-148. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press) 
Costanza, Robert (1994). Three General Policies to Achieve Sustainability. In A. Jansson, M. 
Hammer, C. Folke and R. Costanza (eds.) Investing in Natural Capital: The Ecological 
Economics Approach to Sustainability, pp. 392-407. (Washington D.C.: Island Press) 
Costanza, Robert, Ralph d’Arge, Rudolf de Groot, Stephen Farber, Monica Grasso, Bruce 
Hannon, Karin Limburg, Shahid Naeem, Robert V. O’Neill, Jose Paruelo, Robert G. 
Raskin, Paul Sutton and Marjan van den Belt (1997). The Value of the World’s Ecosystem 
Services and Natural Capital. Nature 387, pp. 253-260 
Crowards, Tom M. (1996). Addressing Uncertainty in Project Evaluation: The Costs and 
Benefits of Safe Minimum Standards, Working Paper GEC 96-04 (University of East 
Anglia and University College London: Centre for Social and Economic Research on the 
Global Environment) 
Daly, Herman E. and Kenneth N. Townsend (1993). Introduction. In Herman E. Daly and 
Kenneth N. Townsend (ed.) Economics, Ecology, Ethics, pp. 1-10. (Cambridge (Mass.): 
MIT Press) 
30 
Daly, Herman E. and Robert Costanza (1992). Natural Capital and Sustainable Development. 
Conservation Biology 6, pp. 37-46 
Ehrlich, Paul R. and Anne H. Ehrlich (1992). The Value of Biodiversity. Ambio 21, pp. 219-226 
Ehrlich, Paul R. (1989). The Limits to Substitution: Meta-Resource Depletion and a New 
Economic-Ecological Paradigm. Ecological Economics 1, pp. 9-16 
Ekins, Paul (1996). On the Dividends from Environmental Taxation. In Timothy O’Riordan (ed.) 
Ecotaxation, pp. 125-162. (London: Earthscan) 
Faucheux, Sylvie and Géraldine Froger (1995). Decision-Making under Environmental 
Uncertainty. Ecological Economics 15, pp. 29-42 
Goulder, Lawrence H. (1994). Environmental Taxation and the 'Double Dividend': A Reader's 
Guide, Working Paper No. 74 (Munich: Center for Economic Studies University of 
Munich) 
Hahn, Robert W. and Robert L. Axtell (1995). Reevaluating the Relationship Between 
Transferable Property Rights and Command-and-Control Regulation. Journal of 
Regulatory Economics 8, pp. 125-148 
Hahn, Robert W. (1990). The Political Economy of Environmental Regulation: Towards a 
unifying Framework. Public Choice 65, pp. 21-47 
Hanley, N., S. Hallet and I. Moffatt (1990). Why is More Notice not Taken of Economists 
Prescriptions for the Control of Pollution?. Environment and Planning A 22, pp. 1421-
1439 
Hartwick, John M. (1990). Natural Resources, National Accounting and Economic Depreciation. 
Journal of Public Economics 43, pp. 291-304 
Holling, C.S. (1995). Sustainability: The Cross-Scale Dimension. In Mohan Munasinghe and 
Walter Shearer (eds.) Defining and Measuring Sustainability: The Biogeophysical 
Foundations, pp. 65-75. (Washington D.C.: The World Bank) 
IPCC (1996). Climate Change 1995 — Economic and Social Dimensions of Climate Change — 
Contribution of Working Group III to the Second Assessment Report of the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press) 
31 
Jackson, Tim (1995). Price Elasticity and Market Structure — Overcoming Obstacles to Final 
Demand Energy Efficiency. In Terry Barker, Paul Ekins and Nick Johnstone (eds.) Global 
Warming and Energy Elasticities, pp. 254-266. (London: Routledge) 
Jacobs, Michael (1995). Sustainable Development, Capital Substitution and Economic Humility: 
A Response to Beckerman. Environmental Values 4, pp. 57-68 
Jaeger, William K. (1995). The Welfare Cost of a Global Carbon Tax when Tax Revenues are 
Recycled, Resource and Energy Economics 17, pp. 47-67 
Jaffe, Adam B., Steven R. Peterson and Robert N. Stavins (1995). Environmental Regulation and 
the Competitiveness of U.S. Manufacturing: What Does the Evidence Tell Us?. Journal of 
Economic Literature 33, pp. 132-163 
Jochem, Eberhard and Edelgard Gruber (1990). Obstacles to Rational Electricity Use and 
Measures to Alleviate Them. Energy Policy 18, pp. 340-350 
Lutz, Ernst (1992), Agricultural Trade Liberalization, Price Changes, and Environmental Effects. 
Environmental and Resource Economics 2, pp. 79-89 
McCoy, Daniel (1996). Reflections on the Double Dividend Debate. In Timothy O’Riordan (ed.) 
Ecotaxation, pp. 201-214. (London: Earthscan) 
Meadows, Dennis, Donella Meadows, Erich Zahn and Peter Milling (1972). The Limits to 
Growth (New York: Universe Books) 
Norton, Bryan (1986). Commodity, Amenity, and Morality — The Limits of Quantification in 
Valuing Biodiversity. In Edward O. Wilson (ed.) Biodiversity, pp. 200-205. (Washington 
D.C.: National Academy Press) 
Oates, Wallace E., Karen Palmer and Paul R. Portney (1993). Environmental Regulation and 
International Competitiveness: Thinking about the Porter Hypothesis, Working Paper No. 
93-11 (Washington D.C.: Resources for the Future) 
Palmer, Karen, Wallace E. Oates and Paul R. Portney (1995). Tightening Environmental 
Standards: The Benefit-Cost or the No-Cost Paradigm?. Journal of Economic Perspectives 
9, pp. 119-132 
Pearce, David W. (1994). The Precautionary Principle and Economic Analysis. In Timothy 
O'Riordan and James Cameron (eds.) Interpreting the Precautionary Principle, pp. 132-151. 
(London: Earthscan) 
32 
Pearce, David W. (1991). The Role of Carbon Taxes in Adjusting to Global Warming. Economic 
Journal 101, pp. 938-948 
Pearce, David W. (1996). Valuing the Environment, Lecture notes from a lecture in the 
Cambridge University series ‘Valuing the Environment’ 
Pearson, Mark (1995). The Political Economy of Implementing Environmental Taxes. 
International Tax and Public Finance 2, pp. 357-373 
Perrings, Charles and David W. Pearce (1994). Threshold Effects and Incentives for the 
Conservation of Biodiversity. Environmental and Resource Economics 4, pp. 13-28 
Perrings, Charles (1994). Biotic diversity, sustainable development, and natural capital. In A. 
Jansson, M. Hammer, C. Folke and R. Costanza (eds.) Investing in natural capital: the 
ecological economics approach to sustainability, pp. 92-112. (Washington D.C.: Island 
Press) 
Perrings, Charles, Carl Folke and Karl-Göran Mäler (1992). The Ecology and Economics of 
Biodiversity Loss: The Research Agenda. Ambio 21, pp. 201-211 
Porter, Michael E. and Claas van der Linde (1995). Toward a New Conception of the 
Environment-Competitiveness Relationship. Journal of Economic Perspectives 9, pp. 97-
118 
Preston, Samuel H. (1996). The Effect of Population Growth on Environmental Quality. 
Population Research and Policy Review 15, pp. 95-108 
Randall, Alan (1991). The Value of Biodiversity. Ambio 20, pp. 64-68 
Roodman, David Malin (1996). Paying the Piper: Subsidies, Politics, and the Environment, 
Worldwatch Paper No. 133 (Washington D.C.: Worldwatch Institute) 
Ruttan, Vernon W. (1991). Constraints on Sustainable Growth in Agricultural Production: Into 
the 21st Century. Canadian Journal of Agricultural Economics 39, pp. 567-580 
Schuh, Hans (1995). Viele Arten, wenig Wissen. DIE ZEIT Nr. 48, p. 25 
Solow, Robert M. (1993). An almost practical step toward sustainability. Resources Policy Sep-
tember, pp. 162-172 
Stavins, Robert N. (1996). Correlated Uncertainty and Policy Instrument Choice. Journal of 
Environmental Economics and Management 30, pp. 218-232 
33 
Stavins, Robert N. (1995). Transaction Costs and Tradeable Permits. Journal of Environmental 
Economics and Management 29, pp. 133-148 
Stevens, Thomas H., Jaime Echeverria, Ronald J. Glass, Tim Hager and Thomas A. More 
(1991). Measuring the Existence Value of Wildlife: What Do CVM Estimates Really 
Show?. Land Economics 67, pp. 390-400 
Swanson, Timothy (1994). The Economics of Extinction Revisited and Revised: A Generalised 
Framework for the Analysis of the Problems of Endangered Species and Biodiversity Loss. 
Oxford Economic Papers 46, pp. 800-821 
Tindale, Stephen and Gerald Holtham (1996). Green Tax Reform — Pollution Payments and 
Labour Tax Cuts (London: Institute for Public Policy Research) 
Waggoner, Paul E. (1994). How Much Land Can Ten Billion People Spare for Nature?, Task 
Force Report No. 121 (Ames: Council for Agricultural Science and Technology) 
World Bank (1992). World Development Report 1992 — Development and the Environment 
(New York: Oxford University Press) 
WRI (various years). World Resources — a joint publication from the World Resources Institute, 
United Nations’ Environment Programme, United Nations’ Development Programme and 
the World Bank (Washington D.C.) 
 
